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RECENT ENGLISH DECISION.
Court of Appeals.
WILSON v. GLOSSOP.
Where a husband connives at adultery on the part of his wife, hut subse-
quently turns her out-of-doors for the offense, and she is without private
means of support, he is liabie for necessaries furnished to her while apart
from him.
AcTrIoN" brought in the Sheffield County Court to recover for
necessaries furnished to the defendant's wife under the circum-
stances mentioned in the head-note; the court gave judgment
for the defendant, whereupon the plaintiff appealed to the Queen
Bench Division. That court (NIATrrIEw and CAVE, JJ.), al-
lowed the appeal and gave judgment for the plaintiff. The ap-
peal was taken from the Divisional Court.
Moorsom, Q. C., for appellant.
Rerbert Reed, contra.
LORD ESnER, 'M. R.-In this ease, the plaintiff is to be
taken to be in the position of a stranger, who has supplied
things necessary for the maintenance of a married woman, living
apart from her husband. There were proceedings in the Divorce
Court, at this suit, for a dissolution of marriage on the ground
of the wife's adultery, and the jury found that she had commit-
ted adultery, but that her husband had connived at it. On this
state of facts the Divisional Court decided that he was bound to
pay for the sustenance of his wife, and gave judgment for the
plaintiff. The defendant has appealed.
When a man marries, he is bound to kteep and maintain his
wife, unless she has committed adultery, and further, he is
bound in honor, to protect her from infamy. This man has done
the reverse. The argument for him, to exonerate him from lia-
bility to maintain his wife, would, if it is sound, establish that
if he had forced his wife to prostitution and lived on the pro-
ceeds of her shame, he might still, whenever he pleased so to do,
turn her out-of-doors for that very adultery, and declare that he
was no longer liable for her maintenance. Nothing could in-
duce me to declare that such was the law, except a superior au-
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thority which would bind me. I do not care to consider
whether the wife can, under these circumstances, claim restitu-
tion of conjugal rights. That a husband, even after his wife
has comnitted adultery, should turn her out without means of
support, is harsh, but to say that a man who has been an accom-
plice can do so, is degrading. There is not, and there could not
be a symptom of authority in support of such a proposition.
The judgnient of the court below was therefore right, and this
appeal is dismissed.
FRy, L. J.-If a husband turns away his wife without means
of support for any cause, not in law justifying such an action,
she carries with her the right to pledge his credit for necessaries.
The question then is, whether the adultery of the wife with the
connivance of her husband, is such a justification. Oin this
point, there is no direct authority. In my opinion, to say that
such circumstances justify the husband in turning his wife out-
of-doors, would be morally and socially wrong. The husband's
act being thus without justification, she carries with her the
right to pledge his credit for necessaries. That right she has
exercised, and he is liable in this action.
LoPEr, L. J.-The facts of this case are not in dispute and
can be shortly stated. The wife of the defendant committed
adultery with his connivance. The husband subsequently turned
her out-of-doors. She had no means of support and she was
supplied with necessaries for her maintenance by the plailitiff,
who now seeks to make the defendant liable for the money so
expended.
During cohabitation there is a presumption, though a rebutta-
ble one, arising from the circumstances of cohabitation, that the
wife is, in certain cases, the agent of her husband and entitled to
pledgehis credit. But when the wife is living apart from her
husband at the time of making the contract, the presumption is
the other way, and it lies on the creditor to show that the wife
is living apart from her husband tinder such circumstances as
give her an im)lied authority to bind him. If she is turned
away by her husband without any justifiable cause and without
the means of supplying herself with necessaries, the husband is
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bound by any contract she makes for necessaries suitable to her
degrec and estate: per BAILEY, J., Jflonh.rque- v. Benedict, 3 B.
& C. 6:35 (1825); 2 Sn. L. C. (9th ed.) 504. Again, in East-
,ai, v. Burchell, 3 Q. B. D. 432 (1878), Lusi, J., says, "The
authority ofa wife to pledge the credit of her husband is a dele-
gated, not an inherent authority. If she binds him, she binds
him only as his agent. This is a well-established doctrine. If
she leaves him without cause and without consent, she carries
no implied authority with her to maintain herself at his expense.
But it' he wrongfully compels her to leave his home, lie is bound
to maintain her elsewhere."
Apply the law so laid down to the present case. A husband
who has connived at the adultery of his wife, turns her out-of-
doors without the means of providing herself with necessaries;
does he not wrongfully compel his wife to leave his home?
WVhat right has le to comlplain of that to which le has been a
willing party? And wlhat justification is there for his turning
his wife out-of-doors without the means of supplying he-self
with necessaries?
Ha'ris v. Morris, 4 Esp. 41 (1801), relied on in the court
below, seems to proceed on the ground that the husband's lia-
bility revives, if he takes the adulteress back into his house, and
if he turns her out again, he does so with credit for necessaries.
This case does not seem to assist in the decision of the one now
before this court. Lord KEN-iYON seems to found his judg-
ment on the fact that she was sponte retracta.
Appeal dismissed.
We are not aware that this exact
qIuetion has arisen in any American
court, but the principles involved
have frequently been under con-
sideratin.
In the first place if a wife commits
adultery, without any connivance by
her husband, it justifies him in send-
ing her away, and then lie is no
longer liable for her support else-
where; certainly not to one who knew
he had discarded her for that cause:
.Huncr" v. Boucher, 3 Pick. 2S9 (1825).
In this case, it was said that the bus-
band was not liable even without
notice, for the very fact of separation
is enough to put persons upon their
guard, and to require them to ascer-
tain the cause of the separation,
whether from cruelty of the husband
or the crime of the wife; for in one
case lie is liable for her support, in
the other not.
Whether adultery of the wife alone
revokes her authority to buy neces-
saries for herself and family, if she
continues to live with her husband,
has not yet, so far as we know, been
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judicially settled in America. Ap-
parently it would not. The continued
living with her by the husband might
weil be held a condonation and a con-
tinuation of her original right and
authority, and doubtlez-s vur courts
would follow the cases of -Norton v.
Fazan, I B. & P. 226 (179S!, and
.Hirris v. _1orris, 4 Esp. 41 (1S01), in
thi respect. And see lleaderson v.
Stringc,, 2 Dana, 2f1 (lS34).
Adukery alone, did not, as is well
known, at the early common law,
forfeit the wife's rizht of dower in
her hu:-band's estate: Cogswrll v. Tib-
beft's, 3 N. 1-. 41 (1824); Lakin v.
Lakin, 2 Allen, 4.5 (IS61); Bryan v.
Bakhdcll'r, 6 R. I. 543 (1860); Little-
field v..Paul, 69 Me. 527 (1879) ; Smith
v. Woodwortlh, 4 Dillon, 584 (1877).
It was not until the Statute of West-
minster, II (13 Edw. I, c. 34), that
any such effect was given to it, and
that statute required that she should
leave her husband, and "continue
with the adulterer," in order to bar
her dower. And if the husband after-
wards "suffer her to dwell with him,"
her right of dower was restored. A
fortiori it would seem therefore, that
if a wife was allowed to live with
her husband after her adultery, sle
could still pledge his credit, as before,
for necessaries. Besides, the Statute
of Westminster required an elope-
ment by the wife, as well as adultery,
in order to bar her dower. For if he
wrongfully deserted her, and she was
afterwards guilty of adultery, she did
not thereby forfeit her dower: Graham
v. Law, 6 Up. Can. C. P. 310 (1857):
approved in .Red v. Elder, 62 Penn.
St. 317 (1869); THeslop v. Heslop, 82
Penn. St. 537 (1876).
As to the effect of the husband's
connivance, the decision in the prin-
cipal case seems right enough. That
a husband cannot obtain a divorce for
the wife's adultery, to which he con-
nived is fami;iar law: Pircet: v. Pic;'c,
3 Pick. 29". 1S253'; Gmi,'m., v. Cairn. ,
10 't Mas. 40S k1 S721: M1forrison v.
r,'i.on. 136 'Mass. 310 18S4). The
ground being, that lie cannot take
advantage of any wrong done him by
his own consent or procurement. It
would certainly seem, therefore, that
lie could not do so in a mere civil
action for her necessary support, and
we cannot doubt but that the princi-
pal caz-e is correct and would be fol-
lowed in America.
Ferren v. _1oore, 59 N. H. 106
(1879,, presents the remarkable case
of a husband agreeing in reiting that
his wife might commit adultery,
"upon condition that she should not
look to him for support." Of course,
it was held that adultery under such
ciraumstances would not terminate
his lialility for her support, by one
who was in no way connected with the
illegal transaction.
And by "connivance or procure-
ment" here is meant something more
than a direct participation by the
husband in his wife's crime. Ile may
indirectly lead her to commit adultery,
or at least be so far responsible for her
fall, that lie cannot afterwards deprive
her of the rights in his estate she
otherwise would have. Thus in Cart-
wright v. Bate, 1 Allen, 514 (1861), it
was held that if a husband wrongfully
expels his wife without cause, and
afterwards intentionally misleads her
to believe that he is dead, and she,
acting honestly in that belief, marries
another, whom she leaves at once
upon hearing that her husband is
alive, he cannot avail himself of the
second marriage, and her conviction
of bigamy, in defense to an action for
necessaries, subsequently furnished her;
even though the plaintiffdid not know
all the circumstances when lie fur-
nishied the support. This well may
be supported eon the ground of equit-
